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Identifying the financial barriers to 
deliberative, affordable apartment 
development in Australia  
 





The purpose of this paper is to identify the financial barriers to the supply of affordable apartments 
in Australia and examine whether demand aggregation and ‘deliberative development’ (self-build) 
can form a new affordable housing ‘structure of provision’. 
Design/methodology/approach  
Market design, an offshoot of game theory, is used to analyse the existing apartment development 
model, with ‘deliberative development’ proposed as an innovative alternative. Semi-structured 
interviews with residential development financiers are used to evaluate whether deliberative 
development could obtain the requisite development finance. 
Findings  
Our investigation into the financial barriers of a deliberative development model suggest that while 
there are hurdles, these can be addressed if key risks in the exchange process can be mitigated. 
Hence, affordability can be enhanced by ‘deliberative development’ replacing the existing 
speculative development model. 
Research implications  
Market design is a new innovative theoretical approach to understanding the supply of housing, 
offering practical solutions to affordable apartment supply in Australia. 
Originality/value  
This research identifies financial barriers to the supply of affordable apartments; introduces 
theoretical understandings gained from market design as an innovative solution; provides evidence 
that a new structure of building provision based on ‘deliberative development’ could become a key 




Australia has experienced a long period of housing price inflation coupled with a chronic under-
supply of new housing stock. This has resulted in a serious decline in housing affordability for low 
and middle-income households (NHSC, 2013). In response, urban consolidation policies have 
sought to shift housing supply from greenfield sites to existing urban areas, which presupposes 
apartments as the new dominant housing type (Goodman et al., 2010).  Such urban intensification 
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is frequently seen as over-development (Woodcock, Dovey, Wollan and Robertson, 2011) with 
apartments criticised for being generic, and of poor quality and design (Newton and Glackin, 
2014). Such criticisms are laid at the feet of speculative apartment builders in the US (Pieser and 
Hamilton, 2014) and in the UK (Adams, 2014). Challengingly, in the Australian context, there has 
been no improvement in affordability (Rowley and Phibbs, 2012) despite this being a desired 
outcome of such urban consolidation policies.   
 
The failure of the market to deliver affordable apartments has variously been laid at the door of the 
planning system, at taxation policy, and at poor construction productivity, each of which is seen as 
adding to the rising cost of production (Burke, 2012; NHSC, 2013, Rowley and Phibbs, 2012;). 
Most of these commentators typically argue lowering input costs such as government taxes and 
levies, and labour costs would result in cheaper housing and more supply. However, as Berry 
(2010) notes new housing stock generally comes onto the market reflecting prevailing market 
prices, suggesting demand inputs such as the increased capacity of consumers to pay, have a 
critical role in housing price inflation (Burke, 2012).  
 
Given the level of policy and community concern about housing affordability there is a surprising 
“dearth of academic analysis of the Australian residential building sector” (Dowling 2005, p. 448), 
and only two studies (Judd and Dean, 1983; Rowley and Phibbs, 2012) specifically examine multi-
unit housing. This is not to suggest that little is known about residential development, as 
international and Australian texts provide instruction on the tasks involved with the development 
process (see Cadman and Topping, 1995; Coiacetto, 2012; Peiser and Hamilton, 2012; Reed and 
Sims, 2015).  
 
Ball notes that “empirical evidence related to house-building is limited” (Ball 2012, p. 29). As 
Coiacetto (2001) observes our lack of understanding of apartment provision is further impeded by 
research that treats developers and development as homogenous. Detached, terrace housing and 
multi-story apartments are lumped together as if there are no substantive differences. However, 
Ball (1986) has long argued that each built structure type has a distinct ‘structure of provision’: 
 
“Creating and building built structures invokes particular sets of social agents defined by 
their economic relation to the physical process of provision itself. Each historically specific 
set of social agents can be defined as a structure of building provision. By provision is 
meant the production, exchange, distribution, and use of a built structure. Involved may be 
a landowner, a developer, a building firm, building workers, financiers, building owners, 
and final users. (Ball 1986, p. 455) 
 
The structure of provision approach infers development is dynamic and involves a temporal 
dimension. Drane (2013, p. 2) argues  “property development is not of itself “real estate” but…a 
particular state of transition or change in form of real estate toward a different state with an 
associated change in potential or real value”. This extinguishment of old property rights and the 
creation of new ones as D’arcy and Keogh (2002) describe it is the core of exchange for new 
apartments.  
 
Burke's (2012) sub-systems approach, echoing Ball’s structures of provision, divides housing into 
four conceptual categories: production, consumption, management and exchange. Much 
Australian housing research focuses on factors concerning production (such as planning systems), 
consumption and management (particularly social housing systems), but little attention is given to 
exchange.  Exchange involves: 
 
“… the practices and institutions which facilitate the sale, purchase and renting of housing, 
 with the principal actors here being finance institutions in their many forms, and real estate 
 practitioners. Both are important as facilitative agents in making the development, sales 
 and purchases process possible.” (Burke 2012, p. 46) 
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There is a very substantial gap in the housing literature in regard to exchange and our 
understanding of the critical role of residential development finance in housing supply has only 
recently begun to be filled by Bryant (2012) and Rowley et al. (2014). Our intention here is to build 
on work undertaken by Sharam, Bryant and Alves (forthcoming), which draws attention to how the 
existing exchange sub-system for apartments mitigates against housing affordability. This work, 
using insights from market design, a new field of economics arising out of game theory, argues that 
reform of the exchange sub-system can contribute to a shift in apartment provision from a 
speculative basis to a deliberative basis permitting apartment purchasers to achieve considerable 
cost savings, thus making new housing supply more affordable.  
 
The purpose of this research is to identify the financial barriers to deliberative, affordable housing 
development in Australia. The core queston is:  can deliberative developers in Australia access 
development capital?  To answer this question we interviewed those responsible for lending such 
development capital:  residential development financiers.  Residential development financiers are 
in a privileged position of having detailed understanding of, and deep experience with, the entire 
development process, often across a number of regional markets.   
 
The article proceeds as follows. Section two explains why the exchange sub-market presents a 
problem for affordability and how market design may provide a solution. In section three we outline 
examples of deliberative development. We then turn, in section four, to the methodology used for 
the research and in section five provide the findings from semi-structured interviews with Australian 
residential development financiers. Possible solutions are presented in section six, and 
conclusions are drawn in section seven.  
 
2. Exchange Risk and Aggregation 
Housing prices are driven by many factors. In a strong housing market, new housing stock comes 
onto the market reflecting the price of existing housing in the vicinity (Berry, 2010). If supply lags 
too far behind demand, scarcity will drive asset price inflation. In a weak housing market, 
developers moderate supply in order to minimize potential losses. Prices are also driven by the 
availability of investment and mortgage finance, increased consumer capacity to borrow, 
competition between consumers for well-located housing (Burke, 2012), and by property 
speculation (Woodcock et al., 2011).  Supply chain costs are important, particularly at the project 
viability stage (Rowley et al., 2014) and hence cost projections have a vital role in whether new 
supply brought onto the market (Bryant and Eves, 2014). 
 
Sharam, Bryant and Alves (forthcoming) argue that the inability of the market to supply affordable 
apartments relates to the incapacity of the market to efficiently match supply and demand in order 
to progress an orderly and de-risked development process. The orthodox residential development 
process uses pre-sales (‘off the plan’ sales) to reduce exchange risk and lock in demand so that 
development finance can be released, allowing construction to commence. The purpose of the pre-
sale in the exchange process is to ‘guarantee’ settlement at the end of the project (Bryant, 2010), 
but the cost of litigation means it can be difficult for developers in practice, to obtain legal remedy if 
buyers opt out of the pre-sale contract.  A pre-sale contract therefore only marginally reduces 
exchange risk, and this is far from the only difficulty. Pre-sale campaigns are often both time-
consuming and expensive because the developer, in pursuing buyers, is looking for proverbial 
‘needles in a haystack’.  Further, greater the lapse in time between project initiation and achieving 
the requisite number of pre-sales, the more opportunity there is for external conditions to change: 
interest rates and input costs may rise; other projects may threaten over-supply; credit may tighten. 
Such adverse changes in any number of variables can strip a project of its profitability and viability 
(Rowley and Phibbs, 2012). Apartment projects brought to market this way can therefore be 
described as speculative, in that the project is commenced with the expectation that the residual 
buyers will duly be found.  
 
From an economic perspective, such search and transaction costs incurred in this speculative 
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apartment development process are problematically high.  ‘Market Design’, an offshoot of the 
game theory, offers a solution. Of particular interest are ‘two-sided matching markets’ which 
aggregate buyers and sellers into formal membership pools and provide a market manager to 
facilitate trades. Two-sided matching markets have been implemented across many market and 
non-market settings, ranging from electricity wholesaling, native vegetation offsets, and human 
kidney donation. 
 
Applying market design theory to apartment development, aggregators would recruit potential 
buyers, ascertaining their housing preferences. Registering the interest of buyers pre-identifies 
their demand for new apartments thus reducing developer’s search costs.  Aggregation of the 
supply side would facilitate buyer’s awareness of developers and their products. Thus aggregation 
would remove much of the cost associated with marketing to obtain pre-sales.  Aggregation also 
facilitates market segmentation.  Currently developers provide generic product because the risk 
and cost of finding more differentiated demand segments renders more specialised projects 
unviable. If buyers are aggregated and then segmented into buyer preferences, differentiated 
apartment products can more closely reflect the expressed preferences of the buyers and facilitate 
deliberative development.  Thus aggregation should limit exchange risk. Theoretically aggregation, 
the avoidance of a pre-sales campaign, and deliberative development should reduce apartment 
development risk and search costs, assuming the costs of aggregation are sufficiently low (Rijavek,  
2013).  
 
An important secondary question remains as to whether developers would pass on savings gained 
via aggregation. While ‘market design’ could deliver innovation, the oligopolistic structure of the 
industry (Coiacetto, 2001; Ball, 2012) may still prevent an optimal outcome for consumers. 
Deliberative development as an alternative structure of provision would provide the much needed 
competition.  
 
3. Deliberative development 
What is ‘deliberative development’? It is where a group of intending owner-occupiers become the 
proponent of multi-unit developments in place of the developer.  These ‘self-build’ apartments, can 
deliver better quality and design of housing together with cost savings (Lloyd, Peel, and Janssen-
Jansen, 2015). Deliberative development in Germany has demonstrated consistent savings and 
better housing product (Ring, 2012), although evidence from France (Debarre and Steinmetz, 
2012) and the Netherlands (Lloyd, et al., 2015) is mixed.   
 
In Germany, ‘self-build’ or Baugruppen have been delivering apartments at around 75% of the 
market cost for many years (Alves and London, 2012; Lloyd, et al., 2015; Ring 2012). Unlike 
speculative-based developments, these dwellings are tailored to suit the diversity of households 
involved and embody other collective ambitions, such as higher environmental performance. Once 
the development is completed, individuals have title to their own dwelling with common property is 
managed by the equivalent of an owners’ corporation (de Maddalena and Schuster, 2005). 
Architects specialise in providing project management and support for collective decision-making 
(Liese, 2008). German governments often support such deliberative development (Lloyd, et al., 
2015). In some instances this includes actively facilitating deliberative development by designating 
state-owned land for this purpose, or through the subdivision of appropriately sized lots in 
brownfield redevelopment precincts (de Maddalena and Schuster, 2005).  
 
In Australia, there is one publicly evaluated example of deliberative development (undertaken in 
Fremantle, Western Australia in the 1970s), which demonstrated cost savings similar to the 
German cases (Dolin, London and McQuoid, 1992). Initiated by architects, the project experienced 
considerable difficulties in the pre-development and development phases reflecting churn of 
members and financing problems. Completed at the same time as a conventional speculative 
development next door, the property value of the deliberative development has since far 
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outstripped the value of the neighbouring speculative apartments (London, 2012). As this 
Australian example suggests, informal aggregation has its problems and risks, including obtaining 
adequate financing a key barrier. 
 
In the next sections we provide the findings of interviews with Australian residential development 
financiers.  The financial barriers to deliberative, affordable apartment development in Australia are 
identified and solutions proposed.  
 
4. Methodology  
As stated previously, the purpose of this research is to identify financial barriers to deliberative, 
development in Australia.  The views of ten residential development financiers were obtained 
through semi-structured interviews. The financiers agreed to be interviewed on the basis of 
anonymity. Representatives of three of the “Big 4” banksi were interviewed, two regional lenders 
(representing three different states, one of which was a wholly owned subsidiary of the other Big 4 
bank), two member owned banks, one property advisor/broker, and an individual who had 
previously worked in the finance sector.  Four interviewees were Melbourne based, four Brisbane, 
one Sydney and one Perth. Each operated nationally, and the individual financiers had been 
involved in small projects such as townhouses, worth a few million dollars to large $200m 
apartment towers.   
 
The number of interviews reflects the concentration of the industry; risk management orthodoxy; 
and the limited availability of senior debt providers.  The number of interviews compares favorably 
with previous Australian research (Rowley et al., 2014). The interviews took place between 
October 2012 and October 2013. Seven were conducted in person and three by telephone.  
Interviewees were recruited via several means: professional networks, recommendations of other 
interviewees or third parties, and use of LinkedIn to identify people identifying as residential 
development financiers.  Interview length varied between 30 minutes and an hour.  
 
The interviewees were asked to describe the type and size of projects associated with their lending 
experience; the types of finance they provide; and what their credit assessment criteria involved, 
including: equity required; expertise of project proponents; security requirements; pre-sales 
requirements; profitability targets; contingency allowances; funding of hard versus soft costs.  
 
They were then asked if they had any familiarity with Baugruppen type projects, what they thought 
the critical issues would be; and what barriers may exist for deliberative development. While the 
term was unfamiliar to most, the concept was not, with some lenders having previously financed 
syndicates to undertake such deliberative developments, albeit at the luxury end of the market. 
They were also asked to respond to the idea of aggregating buyers for speculative development. 
Once the interviews were transcribed, the responses were collated according to the questions to 
compare answers. 
 
It is important to note that the nature and amount of residential development finance available at 
any point in time reflects market conditions.  Whilst external conditions on lending are highly 
influential and vary considerably over time and place, on the other hand assessment of 
development projects by major lenders appears to be standardised, with the practice of lending 
governed by common procedures and formal risk management.  To this end the interviews 
revealed a not unexpected degree of consensus on the potential financial barriers associated with 
funding deliberative development in Australia. 
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5. Key financial barriers  
 
5.1 Credibility of the project proponent 
Project proponents of all kinds must demonstrate to their financier that they have the expertise to 
undertake the proposed project as well as a reliable track record of completed and profitable 
projects. Deliberative developers, by definition, are amateurs.  
 
I have no material issue with twenty people [developing together]….[it’s] the experience 
they have in doing it…we’d be looking for a lead person who understands the risk….[We] 
need a package where there is one borrower who has the experience and knows what 
they’re doing in terms of development. (Banker 2) 
 
Lack of expertise or experience was not seen as insurmountable, as prior funding of syndicate 
projects suggests. Financiers suggested deliberative developers could purchase experience and 
expertise by engaging professional project managers who would then engage appropriately 
credentialed construction firms and relevant professionals, in much the same way speculative 
developers do.  
 
Hopefully they’ll pay a good project manager who has the skills, that satisfies me as a 
credit manager, because he’s done it twenty times before. (Banker 5) 
 
Architects and other professionals have been instrumental in bringing the appropriate project 
management skills and decision-making discipline to deliberative developments in Germany. In 
Australia these professionals work for speculative developers on a fee for service basis and could 
do the same for deliberative developers. Likewise, appropriately experienced and credentialed 
construction and/or project management firms could be engaged on a fee for service basis with 
appropriate contractual and performance based protections. 
 
Where the financiers saw risk was in the potential for a lack of robust internal decision-making 
and/or competing instructions being issued. This was put as the need for a single 'voice'. Again, 
management of this issue has been a central feature of the German experience in which architect-
led teams have developed processes and protocols to manage group dynamics, communications, 
decision-making and the line of authority.  
 
5.2 Loan security 
Financiers typically require collateral for development loans. Such collateral is provided as a 
means to minimise losses to the financier if the project fails prior to completion, the loan terms are 
breached, or any other event occurs that might disrupt repayment of the loan with interest.  
Mitigating such financial risk is by way of legal instruments (eg.  first registered mortgage, fixed 
and floating charges, negative pledges etc.) that give lenders recourse to assets including land, 
project documentation, and pre-sale contracts.  Loans are also secured by way of tri-partite 
agreements with third parties such as builders, with banks given step-in rights. 
 
The financiers interviewed reported taking additional security from developers in the form of 
corporate and/or personal guarantees from directors where project assets were insufficient 
collateral.  What this means for deliberative developments is that in the event of a loan default, the 
project proponents may need to sell assets, to raise funds to repay the development loan.  
 
Some of the financiers were particularly nervous about the potential for adverse publicity if there 
was a mortgagee repossession of a deliberative development project.  In speculative development, 
corporate assets are repossessed and liquidated however in the deliberative development model, 
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If something goes wrong and it all gets totally stuffed up and we lose a million dollars we 
don’t want to be on the front page of the Herald-Sun suing couples because they’re tried 
to do the right thing and we’re the bad guys. (Banker 1) 
 
A greater issue was that deliberative developers might not have sufficient unencumbered assets to 
pledge in the first instance.  As with other forms of borrowing, the participation of a guarantor was 
seen as a possible solution.  
 
If as a banker I know I have a guarantee – that someone’s on the hook – then that’s great. 
If you give Rupert Murdochii as a guarantor —no worries! (Banker 5) 
 
5.3 Equity  
Financiers generally fund only a proportion of the development costs, with the remainder of the 
monies provided by the project proponents. The amount the financier is willing to fund depends on 
the financier's risk assessment of the project.  
 
The financiers interviewed indicated deliberative developers would be treated the same as 
speculative developers, requiring equity contribution of between 25 and 40% of total development 
costs. Further, the proponents would need to demonstrate additional financial capacity to fund cost 
over-runs. This parameter suggests that deliberative development would need to overcome a 
significant 'equity gap'.  By way of example, if we assume the cost to develop per apartment 
(including land) is $400,000, an equity contribution of 25% would equate to $100,000 per 
apartment.  A $100,000 cash equity contribution is a considerable hurdle for moderate-income 
households.  We will return to this point in section six. 
 
5.4 Pre-sales 
Financiers require speculative developers to achieve high pre-sales quotas prior to the release of 
funding as a method of securing repayment of the loan.  Financiers suggested this sales and 
marketing expense constitutes as much as 10% of total project costs, ‘making it more costly than 
the finance’ (Banker 1). While deliberative development avoids the need for a pre-sales campaign 
through prior aggregation of ‘buyers’, the financiers said they would treat the project proponents 
(as intending owners) as if they were pre-sales. The reduced project costs were viewed as 
reducing project risk. 
 
Asked to reflect on whether aggregation could have a similarly positive financial impact on a 
speculative development venture, most of the financiers agreed and some cited examples of large 
developers moving away from traditional pre-sales campaigns because of the high cost. The 
others did not disagree but rather needed time to work through the implications of the aggregation 
concept. Tellingly, Banker 2 argued speculative developers would simply expropriate the savings 
rather than pass them through to the buyers. While the costs of establishing and operating 
aggregators is unknown, these remarks confirm aggregation should be regarded as a promising 
market innovation that holds the possibility of reducing the cost of housing provision.  
 
It is worth noting here that deposits paid on pre-sales however are not available to fund the project. 
They are held in trust under Australian Consumer Law.  
 
5.5 Profitability 
The raison d'être of deliberative development is threefold:  to avoid the cost of a presale campaign, 
to aggregate owner-occupiers with similar housing requirements; and to save the cost of providing 
a profit margin to a speculative developer. The financiers indicated however deliberative 
development would still need to demonstrate the project could achieve a profit margin of at least 
20% if the apartments were sold on the open market.  This is the minimum a financier would 
expect from a speculative developer.  
 
From a planning and project perspective I still want to see some profit, a margin. (Banker 5) 




As discussed in the section on LVR (below), the sale price is hypothecated by virtue of a market 
valuation; an actual sale does not need to occur.  In effect, the financiers are simply requiring the 
apartments to be worth more on the market than they cost by a margin of 20%. In economic terms 
this ‘profit’ would be internalised by the project proponent as residual equity.  As with LVR it means 
the apartments would need to have broad appeal. 
 
5.6 Loan to Value (LVR) ratio 
Loan amounts are determined in relation to the end value of the project (known as the loan to 
value ratio). This metric is a reflection of the lender’s worst case scenario of what funds would be 
recouped in a mortgagee in possession situation.  An LVR of 65% was suggested by most of the 
financiers as appropriate for deliberative development.  Again assuming a total cost per apartment 
of $400,000 and a hypothecated profit margin of 20%, a market valuation upon completion would 
need to be at least $480,000 ($400,000 * 120%).  An LVR of 65% therefore suggests the financier 
would lend $312,000 ($480,000*0.65) of the forecast $400,000 construction cost per 
apartment.  Thus requiring an equity contribution of $88,000 per apartment. 
 
Financiers require confirmation by way of independent valuation that the end product would find 
market acceptance thus enabling the lender to recoup their funds should the loan default. Market 
acceptance involves a number of elements. The product itself would need to attract buyers; so 
individual apartments would need to have broad appeal, as would the overall development and 
location.  
 
We need to make sure we get our money back…. [They need to] deliver a product the 
market will look at. (Banker 3) 
 
This presents a serious problem for deliberative development that seeks to reduce housing cost 
via accessing cheaper land in less desirable locations. The proponents may not be able to 
establish that there would be alternative buyers for the proposed product at a price that is 
competitive with pre-existing stock in that area. It would also potentially preclude overly innovative 
or specialised apartment designs.  
 
5.7 Conclusions  
A number of the financiers interviewed had previously financed small syndicates engaged in 
deliberative development, although these were high net worth individuals with ‘deep pockets’ who 
could ‘afford to fail’ and who had other assets to provide for collateral and/or required equity. 
These projects however had been driven by the desire to obtain a specific architectural product, in 
specific locations rather than to address affordability concerns.  
 
The larger lenders were concerned about impacts of deliberative developments, undertaken by 
lower income households, failing. Some bankers were nevertheless concerned about the need to 
find a means of delivering more affordable housing.   
 
The member-owned banks applied the same metrics as the public companies but indicated a 
greater willingness to consider deliberative development, as the cooperative nature of such 
projects reflects their own missions or ethos.  
 
The financiers agreed deliberative developers could acquire development credibility by hiring 
industry professionals to manage their projects.  The rather pessimistic assessment of equity 
requirements, loan security provisions and the possible constraints of LVR requirements, was 
tempered by the financiers accepting deliberative development could reduce demand risk and 
generate cost savings. More optimistically, the financiers indicated there were possible solutions to 
the equity and loan security issues that would permit less wealthy households access to 
deliberative development.   
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6. Possible solutions  
Potential solutions to the financial barriers identified for deliberative development were discussed 
with the financiers. The greatest potential barrier was the equity/security requirements of the bank 
versus the available funds of affordable households.  The financiers suggested the introduction of 
a guarantor, such as government, which would result in a more favourable LVR and thus lower the 
equity requirement threshold.  An alternative to a government guarantee would be access to other 
asset rich balance sheets. Community housing organisations (CHOs) were identified as a possible 
provider. 
 
community housing organisation [x] are in effect already doing this (Banker 4) 
 
CHOs in Victoria for example, build and manage social housing for low to moderate-income 
households. At June 2013 the Victorian CHO sector held $2.5 billion worth of assets with interest 
bearing debt of only $309m (DTF, 2014). Gearing is modest as revenue is limited by the 
requirement to provide affordable rent.  In short, the sector is asset rich but income poor. Therefore 
the balance sheet of a CHO could be used, effectively on a fee for service basis, as security for 
obtaining finance for deliberative developers, either via a financial guarantee provided to bankers 
or the CHO borrowing on the behalf of the deliberative developers. This would overcome the 
critical problem deliberative developers have of providing sufficient collateral. Fees generated by 
the CHO from this activity could be used to support social housing development and/or services.  
 
The two member-owned banks interviewed (as funders of social housing) were particularly 
supportive of CHOs playing this role, and could foresee mixed tenure developments (combining 
deliberative development and social housing) with the deliberative development ‘pre-sales’ 
reducing the development risk.  In this way, mixed social housing/deliberative development would 
reward private house owners willing to have social housing tenants as neighbours, with lower 
housing costs. This could mitigate some community opposition to social housing provision, and 
would achieve the social diversity desired by mixing tenures.  Government or philanthropy could 
establish a guarantee in the form of a revolving social investment fund to support this type of 
development.  
 
Common Equity Housing Ltd, a registered housing association operating in Victoria, and the 
Business Council for Cooperatives and Mutuals (BCCM), are actively investigating how to foster 
cooperatively-based deliberative developments for households ineligible for social housing but 
struggling in the market (BCCM and CEHL, 2014). Central to this innovative concept is the 
capacity of CEHL, by virtue of its healthy balance sheet, to secure development finance.  
 
7. Conclusion 
This research has identified the financial barriers to the supply of affordable apartments in 
Australia and examined whether demand aggregation and deliberative development can provide a 
new affordable housing “structure of provision”. 
 
Following the insights of market design, the economic inefficiency of the traditional presales 
process can be overcome by aggregating buyers, which would also provide the opportunity to 
deliver more tailored housing products. The quest for affordable, quality apartments requires 
economic actors who are willing and able to commit to the supply of such housing and the most 
obvious candidates are consumers themselves. This theory has informed international deliberative 
development groups which have established a credible track record of reducing the cost of new 
apartments. Such deliberative development has been limited in Australia to date reflecting the 
considerable financial barriers. However these barriers could be addressed if support was 
provided, with the community housing sector being one logical collaborator.  
 
The contribution of this research is three-fold.  Firstly, it introduces innovation in terms of how we 
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think about attracting and managing demand for housing by making explicit linkages between 
market design theory and the traditional structure of provision for apartments in Australia.  In doing 
so, it articulates a new structure of provision, moving from speculative to deliberative development.  
Secondly, this research moves beyond theoretical concepts, to initial market testing of this 
innovation.  Having identified the ability to raise capital as a key barrier, this research provides an 
important insight into the opaque spectrum of development finance.  Through this applied inquiry, it 
has been established that while hurdles exist, potential solutions exist that can facilitate the 
success of this innovative idea.  Finally, this research adds to the scant international literature on 
the topics of both deliberative development and of development finance.  Therefore, this research 
provides a contribution to the affordable housing debate and is a step towards delivering much 
needed reform to housing provision in Australia. 
 
Further research on this topic will seek to identify and examine other case studies of deliberative 
development in Australia.  The key learnings of such case studies will be documented with a view 
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i The ‘Big 4’ banks dominate Australia’s notoriously concentrated banking system. The number of 
lenders reduced further in the aftermath of the GFC with less than 20 % of residential development 
lenders remaining (Kent, 2009), with a number of regional lenders merging with the Big 4 banks 
but continuing to trade as separate entities. The Big 4 banks continue to undertake the majority of 
lending in residential development (Bryant, 2012).  
 
ii Rupert Murdoch is an Australian born American businessman and according to the Forbes' 2013 
list of richest Americans is the 33rd richest person in the US and the 91st richest person in the 
world.  
 
 
